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QUESTION PRESENTED 
Whether the Federal Rules of Evidence exclude from 
evidence scientific expert testimony which is not based 
on accepted scientific methods. 
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On Writ of Certiorari to the 
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BRIEF OF PRODUCT LIABILITY ADVISORY COUNCIL, 
INC., NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS, 
BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, AND CHEMICAL 
MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION 
AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT 
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
The Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. is an as-
sociation of industrial companies formed for the purpose 
of submitting amicus curiae briefs in appellate cases in-
volving significant issues affecting the law of product 
liability. Its members include about 100 major manu-
facturers. 
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The National Association of Manufacturers of the 
United States of America is a non-profit voluntary busi-
ness association representing more than 12,000 compa· 
nies throughout the United States. NAM is affiliated 
with an additional 128,000 businesses through the Na-
tional Industrial Council and the NAM Associations 
Council. NAM members are parties in cases nationwide 
and are interested in the fair administration of justice, 
which includes the appropriate use of scientific testimony. 
The Business Roundtable is an association of the chief 
executive officers of approximately 200 of the largest _ 
companies in the nation. The Roundtable examines pub-
lic issues that affect the economy and develops positions 
that seek to reflect sound economic and social policies. 
The Chemical Manufacturers Association is a non-
profit trade association whose member companies pro-
duce, market, and use industrial chemicals. Its members 
comprise more than 90 percent of the productive capacity 
for basic industrial chemicals in the United States. 
This casP is of paramount interest to amici because it 
illustrates the acute dangers to businesses and to society 
posed by the unchecked use of aberrant scientific testi-
mony in the courtroom. While the district and appellate 
courts below acted properly in this ~ase to filter out such 
testimony, other courts have not been so vigilant. The 
predictable result has been that businesses like respond-
ent ha Ye abandoned the develoP.ment of promising inno-
vations and groundbreaking products because of the fear 
of unsound science in the courtroom and the enormous 
litigation risks this scenario presents. As principal voices 
. of the business and manufacturing communities, amici 
are well suited to emphasize for the Court the impact 
of aberrant expert te~timony on private litigants, and 
the need for courts to exercise responsible control over 
what is allowed to pass before juries in the guise of 
"expert" testimony. fl-
* Pursuant to Rule :l7. letters of consent have been filed with 
th<: Clerk of the Court. 
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Judge Learned Hand once made an observation that 
goes to the heart of this case: 
No one will deny that the law should in some way 
effectively use expert knowledge wherever it will aid 
in settling disputes. The only question is as to how 
it can do so best.1 
Amici submit that the Federal Rules of Evidence ex-
clude expert scientific testimony when it has been 
developed without regard for accepted scientific methods. 
That is the precise situation in this case. 
This case focuses on expert scientific evidence. Such 
evidence plays a vital and often dispositive role in mod-
ern litigation. For scientific evidence to be helpful to 
the factfinder it must meet some minimal threshold of 
reliability. To hold otherwise would be to allow a system 
of adjudication based more on chance than on reason. 
An essential element of our system of dispute resolu-
tion is the principle that judgments reached in accordance 
with reliable evidence will promote accuracy and avoid 
mere speculation. The putative expert who offers to tes-
tify about issues of science without regard to the scien-
tific method imperils the very foundation of rational 
decision-making. It is neither practical nor sufficient to 
rely on the give-and-take of cross examination to correct 
for expert scientific evidence offered without sound foun-
dation. Indeed, admitting the testimony of experts whose 
methodology falls well outside the scientific mainstream 
undermines faith in our system of justice, deters invest-
ment in new technologies, and results in unwarranted 
judp.ments. This proceeding presents a chief case in 
point: respondent ceased distributing domestically the 
drug Bendectin in order to curb litigation expenses asso-
1 Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations R egard-
ing E:rpert Tt> stim'lny, 15 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 40 (1902). 
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ciated with that product, even though study upon study 
has now concluded that the attack on Bendectin was 
scientifically unfounded. 
Amici believe that a rational system of dispute resolu-
tion requires that federal courts exercise their express 
authority under the Federal Rules of Evidence to scru-
tinize and monitor the quality of expert testimony, espe-
cially where, as here, that testimony is at odds with a 
rich and voluminous body of scientific literature. Amici 
support fully the development of innovative science, and 
believe that the Rules must be construed so as to impose 
standards for expert testimony which are not so high as 
to stifle this development, but not so low as to permit 
the introduction of aberrant science in the courtroom. 
The federal courts should use reliable science to help 
resolve legal disputes; they should not be asked to rewrite 
science. 
In keeping with this Court's rules on amicus practice, 
this brief will not address issues that have been or are 
likely to be raised by the briefs of the parties or other 
amici, but will focus instead on four matters pertinent to 
this case but not likely to be fully addressed elsewhere. 
Part I demonstrates that experts have historically been 
afforded uncommonly wide testimonial latitude, and that 
this latitude has historically and necessarily been circum-
scribed by a series of "gateways," reaffirmed by the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, which protect the judicial process 
and ensure rational decision-making. Part II refutes 
petitioners' suggestion that the "adversarial system"-
and, in particular, the availability of cross-examination-
is an adequate check on unsound expert testimony, and 
the related contention that the Federal Rules of Evidence 
reflect a congressional determination to substitute the 
adversarial system for the courts' historic responsibility 
to determine whether a particular expert may testify at 
all. Part III explains why petitioners' attempted com-
parison between the use of scientific evidence in the ad-
5 
ministrative context and in the co,1rts is flawed. Finally, 
Part IV explains that the courts below correctly excluded 
petitioners' proffered "scientific" testimony because under 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, such testimony must be 
developed according to the scientifi~ method. 
ARGUMENT 
I. OUR JUDICIAL SYSTEM VESTS SUBSTANTIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY IN THE COURTS TO CIRCUM-
SCRIBE EXPERT TESTIMONY 
Petitioners have brought this case cl iming that the 
Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted t, "limit judi<'ial 
creativity" (Petitioners1 Brief at 25), and to leave courts 
with little or no authority to fcashion or apply guidelines 
as may be necessary to ch~u~inscribe expert testimony. 
As shown below, petitioner~-~ i '.b ;(n} of a neutered judi-
ciary, forced to indulge me t an.'l' e~pert tes.timony, ig-
nores the wide latitude historicaily afforded experts in 
our judicial system. The vast !:le.ope of this latitude is 
shown in Part A below. This latitude has in tut:rn fos-
tered checks or "gateways" which logically and i:i.istori-
cally have been found necessary to limit such testimony . 
Part B shows that these limits are embodied in th'¥ Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence. 
A. Experts Are Afforded Testimonial Latitude Well 
Beyond That Afforded Lay Witnesses 
Petitioners' analysis initially fails to take account of 
the extraordinary latitude afforded experts in our scheme 
of justice. In critical respects, experts, despite their cen-
tral role in modern litigation, are freed from the sub-
stantial constraints imposed on their lay counterparts. 
1. Experts are Free to Render Opinions Not Based on 
Firsthmul I<.1wwledge. The rule that experts are free to 
render opinion-: based on other than firsthand knowledge 
has long distinguished expert from lay testimony. One of 
the earliest rules of excl 1-1sion at common law held that 
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witnesses could only testify as to matters within their 
personal knowledge.2 An early scholar summarized the 
state of the law on this point: 
A witness examined as to facts ought to state those 
only of which he has had personal knowledge .... 
It has been said that a witness must not be examined 
in chief as to his belief or persuasion, but only as to 
his knowledge of the fact . . . . As far as regards 
mere belief or persuasion which does not rest upon a 
sufficient and legal foundation, this position is cc,r-
rect,-as where a man believes a fact to be true 
merely because he has heard it said to be so. 
Thomas Starkie, Evidence 173 ( 1824) . In essence, then, 
the so-called "opinion rule" originated as a rule that 
precluded witnesses from testifying about matters about 
which they had no knowledge or personal acquaintance. 
It was, in effect, a "gateway" that precluded certain 
individuals from testifying at all, or, in Wigmore's words, 
"merely a recognition of an otherwise established general 
principle of testimonial qualifications that the witness, to 
be competent at all, must have personal observation. Had 
the matter gone no farther, there would have been no 
separate 'opinion rule,' but merely a special application 
of an ordinary principle of testimonial competency." 7 
John H. Wigmore, Emdence in Trials at Common Law 
§ 1917, at 3 (Chadbourn rev. 1978) (citations omitted). 
This principle finds full expre8sion in Rule 702 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, which permits an expert to 
"testify ... in the form of an opinion or otherwise," 
and in Rule 703, which permits experts to testify based 
on information which is simply "made known" to the 
expert "at or before the hearing." By contrast, Rule 701 
continues to require that the opinion of a lay witness be 
"based on the perception of the witness" and be "helpful 
to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony." 
2 This was also a general rule of civil and canon law. See William 
S. Holdsworth, 9 A History of English Law 211 n.4 (1926) . 
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2. Experts Can Testify About Otherwise Inadmissible 
Hearsay. The evidentiary rule most frequently associated 
with the AnglerArnerican system is the ban on most 
forms of hearsay testimony.3 The modern rule, as em-
bodied in Rule 802, is premised on the notion that such 
evidence is inhE:rently untrustworthy, in large part be-
cause it is not amenable to cross-examination. 
In salient respects, however, this rule does not apply 
to experts. For instance, Federal Rule 803 ( 18) permits 
experts to testify about statements contained in published 
works that are established to be reliable authorities. And 
Rule 703 permits an expe1't to :. :' 3e an opinion on facts 
or data thJt may otherwise bt :.i1aclmissible if they are of 
a type ren :ona· '. y relied upun by experts in the particular 
field. 
3. E~'Cr· · ~ Can Res'Fond to Hypothetical Questions. 
At co: :r;_18 n .:: w and under the Federal Rules, only ex-
perts tre rJermitted to respond to hypothetical questions. 
2 Wigmore, su'{lla, s 67U. Prior to enactment of the 
Federal Rules, howeYer, f-Jme courts had required that a 
hypothetical question (J , include all relevant facts, (2 ) 
omit any facts that were not supported or not likely to 
be supported by evidence before the trier of fact, and 
(3) be stated i_n open court. Charles T. McCormick, 
McCormick on EV'idence § 14, at 37-38 (Edward W. 
Cleary et al. eds. 1 3d ed. 1984) ; 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 552 
( 1964). The Federal Rules liberalized the restrictions on 
hypothetical questions which may be asked of an expert. 
'I'he combination of Rules 702, 703 and 705 enables coun-
sel to ask hypothetical questions that incorporate facts or 
3 Even before there was a generalized rule excluding hearsay, 
such evidence was viewed as inferior. The push toward adoption of 
a rule excluding hearsay came in part from a number of celebrated 
trials during the early sixteenth century in which obvious injustice 
was wrought by reliance on hearsay. See generally Richard 0. 
Lempert & Stephen A. Saltzburg, A Modern Approach to Evidence 
(2d ed. 1983). 
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data not actually-in evidence, and which need not be dis-
closed during examination; they can be given to the 
expert in the secrecy of the office of the counsel who will 
present him. 
4. Experts Can Testify About Ultimate Issues. Both 
the power, and potential danger, of expert testimony lie 
in large part in the expert's authority to draw conclu-
sions concerning ultimate issues to be decided by the jury. 
The fact that such testimony arguably invades the prov-
ince of the factfinder once led many states to exclude such 
expert opinions in their state court systems. McCormick 
on Evidence, supra, § 12, at 30. The Federal Rules, by 
contrast, expressly allow testimony on ultimate issues, 
save in criminal actions where defendant's mental state is 
an ultimate issue. See Fed. R. Evid. 704." 
As shown by these examples-of which there are 
others 5-many of the fundamental rules of exclusion 
that promote the reliability of evidence simply do not 
pertain to experts, notwithstanding that their status in 
litigation commonly makes experts "as often skillful and 
effective in producing obscurity and error, as in the elu-
cidation of truth." McCormick v. Talcott, 61 U.S. (20 
How. ) 402,409 (1857) (Daniels, J., dissenting). 
4 Federal Rule 704 applies to lay opinions as well as expert opin-
ions. However, lay opinions are governed by the constraint set 
forth in Rule 701, requiring personal knowledge, and therefore are 
less likely to be admitted than expert opinions on the ultimate 
issue. 
5 For instance, experts also are not required to disclose during 
direct examination the facts or data underlying their opinions (Fed. 
R. Evid. 705), and can testify about matters that they learn from 
other witnesses during trial ( Fed. R. Evid. 703). 
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B. The Federal Rules Of Evidence Reimpose Certain 
Historic Gateways As Necessary Checks On Expert 
Testimony 
Given the extraordinary latitude traditionally afforded 
expert witnesses, courts and commentators have long rec-
ognized the need to impose "gateways" through which 
expert testimony must pass for it to be considered us~ful, 
and ultimately admissible, at trial. At the same time, it 
has never been thought that any single mechanism could 
be counted on to rein in expert evidence and curb un-
sound expert practices. Rather, courts have relied o_n 
the fashioning of appropriate principles governing the 
proper use of expert testimony, coupled with the trial 
court's exerci~e of its historic discretion to control the 
conduct of trials and to see to the proper and fair ad-
ministration of justice. The so-called Frye test is a nat-
ural outgrowth of this legacy. See Paul Giannelli, The 
AdrnU:isibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. 
Unite<l States, A Half CentunJ Later, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 
1197 (1980). 
Far from renouncin~ this legacy-as petitioners sug-
gest-the Federal Rules of Evidence support and reaffirm 
it. At the heart of the Federal Rules lies the proposition 
that the federal courts have both the authority and re-
sponsibility to employ rules of exclusion and evidentiary 
limitations to promote the reliability of testimony, 
whether Jay or expert, all to "the end that the truth may 
be ascertained and r the l proceedings justly determined." 
Fed R. Evid. 102. The Federal Rules thus outline a 
series of "gateways" through which proper expert testi-
mony must pass, and which togethe1· are intended to assist 
courts in distinguishing the useful from the useles$, the 
meaningful from the misleading, and the probative from 
the prejudicial expert testimony. 
In particular, the gateways embodied in Rule 702 
1 permitting scientific testimony only if it is based on 
"scientific ... knowledge [that) will assist the trier of 
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fact") , Rule 703 ( requiring that the underpinnings of an 
expert's opinion be "of a type reasonably relied upon by 
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or 
inferences upon the subject" t , Rule 704 ( requiring that 
opinions on the ultimate issue be "otherwise admissible") , 
and Rule 403 (excluding relevant testimony if it will, 
among other things, mislead the jury) provide a flexible 
yet cohesive scheme for "filtering out" expert opinions 
which are not firmly rooted in appropriate methodology 
-which, in the case of scientific testimony, means opin-
ions not rooted in the scientific method. Simply stated, 
an expert's opinion on an issue of science which is devel-
oped without regard to the scientific method cannot con-
. stitute "scientific" knowledge within the meaning of Rule 
702, and therefore can only "mislead[]," "confus [el," 
and "prejudice" the factfinder as those terms are used 
in Rule 403. Evidence which appears to be scientifically 
objective, but which in reality is not, cannot "assist the 
trier of fact" as Rule 702 requires. The Ninth Circuit 
properly applied such constraints on expert testimony in 
excluding petitioners' scientific testimony~ 
II. THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE NEITHER 
REQUIRE NOR PERMIT COURTS TO ABDICATE 
THEIR HISTORIC RESPONSIBILITY TO CIRCUM-
SCRIBE EXPERT TESTIMONY 
Petitioners suggest that the Federal Rules of Evidence 
reflect a determination by Congress- to "let it all in"-
that is, to impose few if any constraints on the admis-
sibility of expe1-t testimony in the first instance, and to 
rely on the adversarial system for weeding out unsound 
scientific testimony and methodology. Petitioners' Brief 
at 15, 39-40. This view reflects not only a misreading 
of the terms and spirit of the Federal Rules, but a 
naive assessment of the potency of unsound scientific evi-
dence in the courtroom. 
11 
A. Cross-Examination Is Not A Meaningful Substitute 
For Judicial Scrutiny 
Fe_w would deny that in many situations, cross-exami-
nation is an effective constraint on aberrant testimony. 
Effective cross-examination, however, presupposes that 
the jury will be able to understand the testimony and 
thus appreciate the weaknesses made evident during cross-
examination.0 There is no such presupposition in the 
context of expert te:;timony. To the contrary, the very 
reason for permitting expert testimony in the first place 
suggests that lay factfinders may not be able to fully 
comprehend and evaluate the testimony before them. This 
inability to fully appreciate scientific evidence can arise 
even in relatively straightforward cases, and can often 
lead a factfinder to embrace the fallacy that because one 
development follows another, the two are causally 
related.7 
Concern over the ability of lay factfinders to fully com-
prehend complex expert evidence is not new. Learnect 
Hand astutely highlighted the conundrum when he wrote: 
6 Effective cross-examination also presupposes that attorneys will 
have ample opportunity to take discovery sufficient to conduct 
effective cross-examination. Yet federal discovery rules substan-
tially restrict the opportunities and methods for discovering ex-
perts. Furthermore, rec~nt amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure curtail the ability of parties to fully discover each 
other's experts. See Paul F. Rothstein, The Collision Between New 
Discovery Amendments and Expert Testimony Rules, Litigation, 
Spring 1988, at 17. And, of course, in criminal cases there is 
virtually no discovery. 
7 With such post hoc reasoning, one concludes that because event 
A preceded event B, it must have caused event B. For example, 
we may see an eclipse of the sun. We then beat on a drum. The 
eclipse disappears and the sun is restored. We conclude that beat-
ing the drum caused the sun to reappear. Alvan R. Feinstein, 
Clinical Epidemiology: The Architecture of Clinical Research 41-
42 ( 1985) . Scientific research is designed to avoid the post hoc 
fallacy. 
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The whole object of the expert is to tell the jury, 
not facts, as we have seen, but general truths derived 
from his specialized experience. But how can the 
Jury judge between two statements each founded 
upon an experience confessedly foreign in kind to 
their own? It is just because they are incompetent 
for such a task that the expert is necessary at aU. 
Learned Hand, Hist<mcal and Practical Considerations Re-
garding Expert Testimany, 15 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 54 (1902). 
This concern is all the more warranted as science-driven 
disputes increasingly wend their way through the federal 
courts. The burden on jurors is especially acute where, 
as here, they are asked to determine causation based on 
a reanalysis of epidemiological data culled a.d hoc from a 
variety of previously published studies all of which point 
in the direction of no causation.8 
s In a sobering study, Dr. Molly Treadway Johnson, now of the 
Federal Judicial Center, sought to determine experimentally the 
ability of lay jurors to comprehend epidemiological evidence bearing 
on causation. Molly Treadway, An Investigation. of Juror Compre-
hension of Statistical Proof of CaUBation (1990) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University). In one experiment, 
25 jurors who had been called for jury duty in Baltimore state 
court were shown two sets of epidemiological data and were asked 
to answer four questions about those data (e.g., whether the results 
of the study indicate that being exposed to a given substance in-
creases a person's risk of developing a certain abnormality). Out 
of 100 yes-no responses, only 41 were correct and only two subjects 
( or eight percent) answered all four questions correctly. In short, 
subjecte performed worse than chance. In a second experiment, 
Dr. Johnson exposed one group of 30 jurors to a videotaped, simu-
lated deposition in which an epidemiologist was being questioned 
by a lawyer. The tape was designed to teach the jurors how to use 
epidemiological information. A second group of 15 jurors was not 
shown the tape. Overall, only three subjects answered all four 
questions correctly. Dr. Johnson found that "there was no differ-
ence . . . between the expert and no-expert groups in terms of the 
number of subjects who used a correct approach at least once." Id. 
at 82-83. "It appears, then, that the expert testimony did not pro-
13 
Beyond the jury's lack of competence in many circum-
stances to evaluate the success of cross-examination, the 
very mystique of science is such that its admission alone 
may prejudice the opponent's opportunity for a fair trial 
beyond the curative powers of cross-examination. Even 
staunch advocates of the "let it all in" approach, such as 
Professor Tribe, acknowledge that 
th~ very mystery that surrounds mathematical argu-
ments-the relative obscurity that makes them at 
once impenetrable by the layman and impressive to 
him-creates a continuing risk that he will give such 
arguments a credence they may not deserve and a 
weight they cannot logically claim. 
Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and 
Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1329, 1334 
< 19711.9 This is only to acknowledge that scientific 
studies have an inherent aura about them which, if not 
properly checked, can "assume a posture of mystic in-
fallibility in the eyes of a jury of laymen," United 
States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974!, 
vide subjects with an understanding of how to analyze and interpret 
epidemiological data." Id. at 83. She concluded that 
[t]he results of Experiments 1 and 2 paint a rather dismal pic-
ture of lay jurors· abilities to understand epidemiological 
analysis. Subjects began with a poor understanding of epi-
demiological reasoning, and apparently were not helped when 
provided with expert testimony. Thus, the initial question of 
whether lay jurors are generally capable of understanding 
statistical proof of causation as it is presented under the cur-
rent system must be answered in the negative. 
Id. at 88. 
0 Professor Tribe was writing in part about People i·. Collins, 
438 P.2d 33, 33 (Cal. 1968), where the California Supreme Court, 
in reversing a conviction ba:-1ed on the erroneous mathematical rea-
soning of an expert witness, warned that " [ m] a thematics, a veri-
table sorcerer in our computerized society, while assisting the trier 
of fact in the search for truth, must not l:ast a spell over him." 
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with the result that jury decisions may clash with "gen-
erally accepted scientific understandings." Note, A Ques-
t i <m of Competence: The Judicial Role in the Regula-
t i<m of Pharmaceuticals, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 773, 780 
(1990 ) . 
Furthermore, the rigid "let it all in" philosophy es-
poused by petitioners would impose enormous costs on 
society, on parties to litigation, and on our system of 
justice. When no or unduly low standards on expert par-
ticipation are imposed in the first instance, the testimony 
that results will often be of little or no evidentiary value, 
yet may still consume vast amounts of the courts' and 
the parties' resources. See Winan.s v. New York & Erie 
R.R. Co. , 62 U.S. 121 How. ) 88, 101 (1858 ). Moreover, 
excessive leniency in permitting the introduction into 
court of "science," however dubious its methodology, 
leads companies to question the wisdom of carrying on 
with the development of novel products which may invite 
courtroom attack. 
If jurors have difficulty understanding epidemiological 
and other scientific evidence, it is unrealistic to presume 
that cross-examination, no matter how skillfully con-
ducted, can remedy the use of unsound expert evidence. 
In such a setting, the imposition of reasonable gateways 
is imperative. 
B. The Federal Rules of Evidence Neither Require 
Nor Countenance Slavish Reliance On The Adver· 
sarial System To Weed Out Unsound Expert Testi-
mony 
The position embraced by petitioners not only over-
states the efficacy of the adversarial system in weeding 
out unsound expert evidence, but reflects a misreading 
of the Federal Rules. In particular, this view is in error 
because it reads the Rules piecemeal and out of context, 
rather than as a matrix of interdependent rules of ex-
clusion. The Advisory Committee notes make clear that 
Congress envisioned that the courts would apply the 
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Rules not in isolation but as a cohesive code. Thus, in 
introducing Rule 704 permitting opinion testimony l)n 
ultimate issues, the Committee noted: 
The abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower 
the bars so as to admit all opinions. Under Rults 701 
and 702, opinions must be helpful to the trier of fact, 
and Rule 403 provides for exclusion of evidence 
which wastes time. These provisions afford ample 
assurances against the admission of opinions which 
would merely tell the jury what result to reach .... 
They also stand ready to exclude opinions phrased in 
terms of inadequately explored legal criteria. 
In practice, federal courts have applied the Federal Rules 
of Evidence as a code, mindful of its conceptual unity. 10 
The "let it all in" approach also overlooks the express 
mandate that the Rules be construed so as to "secure fair-
ness in ad 11inistration" and "elimination of unjustifiable 
expense ar d delay." Fed. R. Evid. 102. As noted above, 
unjustifieo expense and delay would be the predictable 
result were the Federal Rules construed, as petitioners 
suggest, to eliminate the authority of trial courts to ap-
ply rules of exclusion so as to filter out "misleading" 
evidence of no "assist [ance J" to the trier of fact. 
10 See, e.g., United Statn v. ScMtzle, 901 F .2d 252, 257 (2d Cir. 
1990) ("[a]lthough the Federal Rules of Evidence do not bar 
all expert testimony concerning an ultimate issue . . . a district 
court may exclude ultimate issue testimony under Federal Ruic of 
Evidence 702 when it is not helpful to the jury, or under Rule 403 
when it may be unduly prejudicial"); United States v. Scavo, 5!)3 
F .2d 837, 844 (8th Cir. 1979) ; United St.ates v. Brown, 776 F .2d 
:397, 401 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1141 (1986) (though 
expert testimony was not barred by Rule 704(b), "district judges 
should heed the Advisory Committee's ~ote to Rule 704" and also 
consider other "precautionary observations about the admission 
of [expert) testimony"). 
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III. PETITIONERS' ANALOGY TO THE USE OF SCIEN-
TIFIC EVIDENCE BY ADMINISTRATIVE AGEN-
CIES IS UNTENABLE 
Petitioners and certain amici challenge the conclusion 
of the Ninth Circuit because various federal agencies are 
willing to take regulatory action based on unpublished 
scientific research or in the absence of positive epidemio-
logical studies. See, e.g., Petitioners' Brief at 12 n.39: 
Brief of Amici Curiae of Physicians, Scientists and His-
torians of Science in Support of Petitioners at 18; Brief 
of Amici Curiae American Society of Law, Medicine and 
Ethics et al. at 10. In fact, the actions of federal regu-
latory agencies are not germane to the issues raised in 
this case for several reasons. 
First, if procedures used by those agencies to assess 
risks were applied here, petitioners' claims would vanish. 
Simply stated, the United States Food and Drug Admin-
istration, the premier agency in assessing the safety and 
efficacy of drugs, has already determined that Bendectin 
is "safe" and "effective." See Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act § 505 (b), 21 U.S.C. § 355 ( b) tl988, (set-
ting forth prerequisites for FDA approval). 
Moreover, petitioners overlook the differences between 
administrative "risk assessment" and judicial factfinding. 
Administrative action is aimed at regulating future con-
duct. See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 
U.S. 204, 208 11988 l. The statutory missions of federal 
agencies include apprising the public of perceived future 
risks and setting standards to reduce such risks. For ex-
ample, the National Toxicology Program lists a sub-
stance in the Annual Report on Carcinogens if that sub-
stance is "reasonably ... anticipated to be [ aJ carcino-
gen [] ." Public Health Service Act § 3011 b 1 , 4 1, 42 
U.S.C. § 241 I b) , 4 1 11988,. The purpose of the An-
nual Report is risk identification, not resource realloca-
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tion. 11 However, the Program's listing does not penalize 
a manufacturer for past conduct. Regulatory action can 
be triggered even in the absence of an established cause-
and-effect relationship. In sharp contrast, tort litigation 
judges past conduct, and shifts resources only where that 
past conduct actually caused the plaintiff's injuries. 
In addition, the gateways so essential to the trial proc-
ess for ensuring reasoned and consistent decision-making 
are not nearly as critical in the regulatory process. Un-
like jurors, those making regulatory decisions often deal 
with scientific issues as part of th~ir job, and are able to 
fully evaluate such evidence and ascertain potential 
risks. Moreover, since the decisions reached by -agen-
cies govern entire enterprises or lines of commerce, con-
sistency is better assured. And finally, administrative 
agencies are expressly authorized to consider evidence 
that would ordinarily not be admissible in a court of 
law. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556 < d) 
< 1988 I I " [a] ny oral or documentary evidence may be 
received" in administrative proceedings) ; Richardsoo v. 
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 409 (1971) ; McC<Yrm,ick oo Evi-
de_nce, supra, ~ 352, at 1009 (" [a] dministrative agen-
cies generally are not restricted in the kind of evidence 
they can admit") . 
In short, while one can draw meaningful lessons from 
the actions of administrative agencies that might be of 
11 As such. a substance ·•:ill be listed by the National Toxicology 
Program in the Annual Report even though there is no evidence of 
a cause-and-effect relationship between it and cancer; a mere associ-
ation in animal studies will in the agency's view suffice. See Public 
Health Ser\'ice, U.S. Dept. H.H.S., Sixth Annual Report on Car-
cinoge1L-1 \'iii (1991) . It bears noting that in spite of the Program's 
low threshold, " [ o] nly substances for which the evidence of car-
cinogenicity has been peer-reviewed are evaluated for possible in-
clusion in the Annual Reports." Id. There is doubt, even within 
the agency. that this low threshold is consistent with the Pro-
~ram's statutory mandate. See gPnerally Final Report of the Ad-
\·i~ory Re\'iew by thl' National Toxicology Program Board of Scien-
tific Counselors, 57 Fed. Reg. 31,721 (1992). 
\ 
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some use in the context of private litigation, the analogy 
pressed by petition~rti goes too far. Administrative ac-
tion is prophylactic and n,,t retrospective; its purpose is 
to warn of pouible health effects and not to judge 
whether a given agent in fact caused a specified ailment. 
Administrative action iu the health sciences is under-
taken by trained professionals pursuant to a statutory 
mandate, not by jurists and jurors. And administrative 
agencies, unlike federal courts, are not bound by the 
Federal Rules of Evidence. 
What petitioners ultimately fr · · to acknowledge, then, 
is that legal systems fulfill a number of salutary pur-
J>OM!. They provide a socially acceptable means of resolv-
ing disput8, and lend a degree of certainty essential if 
people and enterprises are to invest in ideas and products. 
Fostering certainty, a fundamental goal of the Anglo-
American system, is possible only where the rules that 
guide judicial decision-makers comport with those that 
guide responsible decision-makers in the private sector. 
Products developed through experimentation according to 
the rigors of the scientific method can be fairly judged 
only in light of that same method. 
Petitioners' attempt to equate administrative and judi-
cial action also obscures the fact that to condone tort 
liability based on opinions developed without regard to 
the scientific method increases uncertainty and, corre-
spondingly, poses a significant disincentive to the develop-
ment of new products. See Mahoney & Littlejohn, Inno-
vation on Trial: Punitive Damages Versus New Prod,. 
ucts, 246 Science 1395, 1397 <19891 ("inhibiting effect 
of expanded product liability may ~rmeate a firm's en-
tire decision-making process" I. This problem is particu-
larly acute in the health care sector, where drug manu-
facturers 
might be reluctant to undertake re~earch program~ 
to develop some pharmaceuticals that would pro\"e 
beneficial or to distribute others that are available to 
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be marketed, because of the fear of large adverse 
monetary judgments. Further, the additional expense 
of insuring against such liability-assuming inst11·-
ance would be available--and of research programs 
to reveal possible dangers not detectable by available 
scientific methods could place the cost of medication 
beyond the reach of those who need it most. 
Brown v. Superior Cuurt ( Abbott Laboratories), 751 
P:2d 470, 479· <Cal. 1988) (highlighting examples · In 
which drugs a1nd vaccines were withdrawn or not intro-
duced because of liability concerns) . In this regard, too, 
it is important to distinguish evidentia'ry rules. that e:X-
cl ude aberrant testimony 'when judging 'past" conduct froin 
those rules used by administrative agencies in regulating 
future conduct. 
IV. SCIENTIFIC EXPERT TESTIMONY MUST BE DE· 
. VELOPED IN AcCbRD wrtii . THE' SCIEN'i'ItIC ME'l'BdD ' ) . ' . I • 
This case shows the perils of unchecked expert testi-
mony in the context of complex scientific evidence. For 
instance, the dangers inherent · in permitti'ng experts 'to 
offer opinions on ultimate issues were exemplified by the 
expert affidavits submitted to the district court by peti-
tioners, which are rife with opinions about ultiinate 
issues. Thus, Dr. John Palmer, although having never 
examined the Daubert or Schuller children or their 
mothers, nonetheless stated in his affidavit that "it is my 
opinion . . . that in each case the · drug Bendectin was 
taken at the period of time such as tt> effect [sic] the 
cells that would produce the normal limb structure 1nd 
that Bendectin did cause the limb defects in each . of the 
children." J.A. 192. Such a conclusion, given its "scien-
tific" underpinnings, is "likely to be shrouded with an 
aura of near infallibility, akin to the ·ancient oracle of 
Delphi" 1 United States i·. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 168 
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( 8th Cir. 1975, , , particularly given the jurors' predict-
able lack of facility for scientific information.12 
Likewise, the rule permitting experts to answer hypo-
thetical questions increases the likelihood that jurors will 
accept as true those "facts" that have been artfully in-
corporated into the question even though the!e is no 
evidentiary basis for accepting their validity.13 This con-
cern too was borne out in the case below when one of 
petitioners' experts, Dr. Swan, testified about "Type II 
errors" and concluded erroneously that there is an asso-
ciation between Bendectin and limb reductions. 14 Peti-
tioners summarized her testimony as follows: 
u In fact, one study revealed that 70 percent of attorneys and 
judges surveyed believed that juries -accord scientific evidence more 
credibility than other evidence. Michael J. Saks & Richard Van 
Duizend, The Uae of Scientific Evidence in Litigation 5-6 (1983) 
(citing results of 0. Schroeder, The Foremic Science, in American 
Criminal JU11tu:e: A Legal Stud11 Coneerning the Foremic Sciences 
Personnel (Forensic Sciences Foundation n.d.) ) . 
13 This is of more than hypothetical concern : a substantial body 
of literature suggests that individuals are influenced by inf orma-
tion embedded in questions. In one study, subjects were shown a 
film of an automobile accident. Some were asked: "How fast was 
the white sports car going when it passed the barn while traveling 
along the country road?" No barn existed. Other subjects were 
asked the control question: "How fast was the white sports car 
going while traveling along the country road?" Subjects in the first 
group were significc1ntly more likely to indicate the presence of the 
non-existent "barn" during follow-up questioning than were imb-
jects in the second group. ·Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Malleability 
of Human Memory, 67 Am. Scientist 312, 312 (1979 ). See Eliza-
beth F . Loftus & David G. Miller, Semantic Integration of Verbal 
Information into a Vi&ual Memo7'JI, 4 J. Exp. Psycho!. 19 (1978); 
G.R. Potts, Integrating Neu: and Old Information, 16 J. Verb. 
uarniJig & \'erb. Behav. 305 (1977); Elizabeth F. Loftu~. Leading 
Quc.~tion.~ and the Eyeu·itness Report, 7 Cognitive Psychol. 560 
< 1975); Elizabeth F. Loftus & John C. Palmer, Reconstruction of 
Automobile Destruction : An Example of the Int eraction Bf'tu:een 
Language and .llem,,ry, 13 J . Verb. Learning & Verb. Behav. 585 
< 1974 ). 
14 Epidemiologic studies involve consideration of two statistical 
possibilities : stating that a relationship exists when in fact it 
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Dr. Swan calculated the risk of Type II error from 
the Bendectin studies and found, as to each study, 
that even if Bendectin were ca:using a doubling of 
the incidence of human li1nb reducti<>M there was 
less than a 20 % chance that the study would yield 
a "statistically significant" outcome if "significance" 
was lsic] defined as confidence at the 05% level. 
Petitioners' Brief at 9-10 (footnote omitted). What peti-
tioners neglect to note is that in order to calculate the 
probability of a Type II error one must assume an alter-
nate hypothesis. See B.J. Winer, Statistical Principles in 
EzperimenJ,al Detrign 11-14 (2d ed. 1971); Leonard M. 
Horowitz, El.ementA of Statistics /<Yr Pll'/Jclwlogy ·and Edu-
caticm 243-50 (1974). Thus, Dr. Swan aaBUmed for pur-
poses of her calculation that Bendectin doubl.ed the risk 
of limb reductions. There is literally no evidence in the 
record, or anywhere else for that matter, that supports 
Dr. Swan's alternate hypothesis, i.e., a doubling of the 
risk. Thus, while her testimony appears on its face 
to be highly probative, it in fact lacks evidentiary value.10 
does not (Type I error), and failing to observe a relationship when 
, one actually exists (Type II error). In the Bendectin studies, a 
Type I error occurs if a researcher erroneously concludes that 
Bendectin is associated with limb reductions, when in fact no re-
lationship exists. In contrast, a Type II error is committed if the 
researcher concludes that there is no relationship between the drug 
and limb reductions when one actually exists. 
111 As the Group of American Law Professors noted in their 
amicua curiae brief (at 22), "science subjects theories, hypotheses 
and common ~ense to systematic test." Dr. Swan's alternate hy-
pothesis fails that test. If Bendectin in fact increased the risk of 
limb reductions by a factor of two and if, as a result, the proba-
bility of there being a Type II error were 80 percent, then one 
would expect that of the ten epidemiological studies dealing with 
limb reductions, eight w;,uld show a statistically significant associ-
ation. In fact, none did. The probability that none would show a 
statistically significant association, given Dr. Swan's alternate 
hypothesis, is less than eleven percent. Dr. Swan also appeared 
to ignore one study in which researchers, after finding no associa-
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In these and other respects, the Bendectin litigation 
shows what can go wrong when courts do not impose 
sufficient "gateways" governing the introduction of scien-
tific expert testimony. The gateways embodied in the 
Federal Rules provide a series of threshold tests against 
which such scientific opinion must be measured. These 
tests have their roots both in the language of the··Federal 
Rules and in the scientific method. We submit that the 
tenets of the scientific method articulate what amounts to 
a minimum universal standard against which all putative 
scientific opinion should be judged, a common denomi-
nator linking t~e Frye test and its various adaptations. 
Opinion as to an ultimate fact developed without re-
gard to the scientific method doe& not qualify as "scien-
tific knowledge" as that term is uled in Rule '102. Since 
it would not be relied upon by scientist& in the field, it 
would not "assist the trier of fact" as required by Rule 
702, or be said to be baled on data or methodology 
"reasonably relied upon" by those in the field as re-
quired by Rule 703. Furthermore, since an opinion devel-
oped without regard to the scientific method appears to 
have scientific authority that it in fM.-t does :,ot have, . 
it is "misleading" and "prejudic [ ial]" within the mean-
ing of Rule 403. This does not mean -that novel scientific 
findings that di\'erge from accepted notions ought to be 
rejected. The scientific method does not denigrate novel 
results even where they may clash with commonly held 
beliefs. The scientific method speaks to the process by 
which the scientist reached a conclusion, not to the con-
clusion itself, thereby ensuring the orderly growth of 
knowledge. As such, the scientific method and the phi-
losophy underlying the Federal Rule8 are both premised 
tion between Beudectin and limb reductions, stated that there was 
only an 1~ percent chance of missing a two-fold increased risk to 
Bendectin-users, i.t:., the probability of a Type II error for the 
study was 18 percent. S. Morelock et al ., Hendee-tin and Fetal De-
velopme-nt: A Study flt Boston City Hospital, 142 Am. J . Obstet. 
& Gynecol. 209,212 ( 1982). 
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ultimately on the same objective: the efficient search for 
truth. See Fed R. Evid. 102. 
In particular, the scientific method 111 requires that one 
(1) first set forth a hypothesis, 17 ( 2) design an experi-
ment, or more properly a set of experiments, to test the 
hypothesis,1 11 ( 3) conduct the experiment, collect the 
data, and then analyze those data, ( 4, publish the results 
so that they may not only add to the body of knowledge, 
but also be subject to external scrutiny, 19 and ( 5) ensure 
that those results are replicable and verifiable.'° 
When judged against these standards, petitioners' prof-
fered expert testimony fails to measure up. Petitioners 
did not negate the hypothesis that there is no association 
between Bendectin and limb reductions; did not estab-
lish any alternate hypothesis in accord with the scien-
tific method; did not publish their work for proper peer 
review ; and otherwise did not adhere to standard scien-
tific methodology. Indeed, petitioners did little more than 
1
• The rudiments of the scientific method derive from the work 
of Bacon, Galileo and Newton. Sl'e Eman McMullin, The Dev~lop-
ment of Philosophy of Scieme 1600-1900, Companion to the History 
of Modem Science 816 (R.C. Olby et al. eds., 1990). The pioneering 
work of British statistician Sir Ronald A. Fisher underlies the 
design of scientific experiments more generally. See Ronald A. 
Fisher, The De1ign of Erpnifflfflts 11-26_ (8th ed. 1966). 
17 Su Martin Goldstein & Inge F. Goldstein, How We Knnw: 
An Erplorntion of the Scientific Proc,·RB 19 (1978). 
ui Ser Francisco ,J . Ayala & Bert Black, The NaturP of Scirnce 
nnd tltr Probleni of Dtmarcation, 1 Science and Courts 1 < forth-
c·oming 1993). 
111 Ser g,me,-nlly John M. Ziman, Reliabl" Knou·L,,dg": An EJ·plorn.-
firm of th,· Grounds for Bl'li,f in Srif'?lu <19781. Cf. Prnplr t•. 
r.ollin.<J, 405 N.Y.8.2d :l65, !169 c Sup. Ct. 1978) < new theories must 
lw "ksted in thl' crucible of controlled experimentation and study," 
a procedure that requires "replication of original experimentf'I. and 
scrutiny of the results in variou~ scientific journals"). 
:?o Sn Karl R. Popper, Th,: Logic of Scientific Discovny 44-45, 
5:1-54 (rev. ed. 1972). 
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criticize the work of other scientists. But critiquing 
another's study does not validate one's own. Yet, under 
petitioners' conception of a shackled judiciary, such testi-
mony-though it does not qualify as "scientific knowl-
edge" capable of supporting their burden of proof-
would nevertheless be presented to the jury. 
When attempting to draw scientific conclusions, 
whether at the laboratory bench or the courtroom bar, 
one should at a minimum be required to formulate those 
conclusions in accord with the scientific method. That 
method provides a straightforward, relatively simple, and 
reasonable test for the admissibility of expert opinion. 
It is a test, moreover, which federal judges can readily 
apply, and which, in cases like this, would enable them 
to unearth the fallacies in unsound scientific evidence. 
It does not require the court to make value judgments 
about the legitimacy of the results, or to reject novel sci-
entific conclusions merely because they are novel. Rather, 
it provides the court with guidance for measuring 
proffered evidence against a time-honored threshold, a 
threshold which simultaneously promotes novelty and 
reliability. 
In sum, a.mici submit that the gateways reaffirmed by 
the Federal Rules of Evidence in effect incorporate the 
scientific method, and that -the Frye test represents one 




Petitioners' expert testimony was properly excluded. 
The judgment below should be affirmed. 
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